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A WITNESS AGAINST HIMSELF: A CASE FOR 
STRONGER LEGAL PROTECTION OF 
ENCRYPTION 
Benjamin Folkinshteyn† 
Abstract 
This Article examines the application of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination to compelled disclosure of 
unencrypted data.  Such disclosure can include provision of 
passwords to access encrypted data as well as, increasingly, 
providing unencrypted data after compelled decryption.   
The pervasiveness and persistence of electronic data drastically 
increases the availability of information with potential evidentiary 
value that has not previously existed with physical evidence.  The 
courts have struggled with finding the appropriate balance in 
determining the scope and applicability of the privilege against self-
incrimination to electronic evidence.  The lack of precise physical 
world analogues to encryption has led to particular difficulties in this 
regard.  I argue that encrypted data deserves broader consideration 
under the Fifth Amendment than heretofore established by relevant 
precedent.  The changing technology should not be used as a reason 
to eviscerate the privilege against self-incrimination. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The proliferation of electronic data and digitization, both as a 
storage medium and communication, has been a boon to law 
enforcement.  In particular, technologically enhanced surveillance 
techniques, off-site storage, and “cloud” computing have dramatically 
increased the amount of information available to law enforcement.  
The pervasiveness and persistence of such electronic data drastically 
increases the availability of information with potential evidentiary 
value that has not previously existed with physical evidence. 
Electronic data has also presented a number of challenges. The 
business community and individuals are increasingly aware and 
protective of their electronic data (from prying eyes, both lawful and 
unlawful) as the use of such data exponentially increases.  
Stakeholders have attempted to secure such data by encryption. 
Encryption can prevent even the most determined and 
technologically-equipped third party from discovering the contents 
without the requisite passwords. 
Encryption technology presents an obstacle to those who seek to 
gain access for traditionally illicit purposes, e.g., to misappropriate 
money or property of another. It is also presents an obstacle to those 
who desire to gather information in pursuit of a law enforcement 
function.
1
  Law enforcement personnel may come upon encrypted 
data in a variety of ways, including from electronic wiretapping or 
eavesdropping, seizing evidence, or seeking documentary evidence 
from a witness or defendant through use of a subpoena. 
This paper examines the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination as it applies to encryption.  It examines a 
variety of situations in which  a defendant or witness may be 
compelled to disclose unencrypted forms of encrypted data (including 
documents and electronic mail) alleged to be in his possession, either 
through provision of passwords to decrypt the data or through the 
provision of underlying data after compelled decryption.  Part I of the 
paper discusses the basics of the cryptographic process. It presents a 
four-scenario framework which illustrates the circumstances under 
which self-incrimination conflicts with law enforcement interests.  
Part II provides an overview of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence and 
the judicial gloss on the individual’s ability to exercise the right 
 
 1. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the variety of law enforcement 
functions for which information gathering is an essential part, as well as the constitutional 
limitations of such functions. 
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against self-incrimination.  Parts III and IV discuss the relevant 
judicial decisions tackling Fifth Amendment issues in the context of 
encrypted data.  Part V covers the various analogies courts and 
commentators have used in debating the appropriateness of the 
privilege against self-incrimination in resisting disclosure.  Part VI 
proposes that in the context of illegal content, courts should be 
particularly mindful of compelling disclosure.  Part VII cautions 
against overreaction to perceived threats from encryption to law 
enforcement and points to pre-existing drastic capabilities of law 
enforcement in electronic surveillance.  Finally, Part VIII discusses 
the latest developments in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with 
respect to electronically stored information.  The paper concludes by 
calling for a careful balancing of the various law enforcement and 
individual interests in order to avoid creating unintended negative 
effects on constitutional protections of individual rights. 
I. WHAT IS ENCRYPTION? 
Encryption is a process by which the content of a particular 
message or document becomes unintelligible to a third party by a 
predesignated scrambling protocol.
2
  As a simple example, imagine 
that Bob wants to convey a number to Alice over an observable and 
interceptable transmission medium (such as an email, a letter in the 
mail, or a shout across a crowded room), without anyone being able to 
tell what the number actually is.  To accomplish this task, Bob and 
Alice could agree in secret that before transmitting his message, Bob 
will add 143 to the real number.  Thus, when Bob wants to convey the 
number 20, he will actually send the “encrypted” message of 163.  
Alice can easily “decrypt” it by subtracting 143 and realize that the 
real message is 20.  No other observer can determine what the real 
message is without knowing the encryption protocol (addition), or the 
particular encryption key (143).  Real-world ciphers in use today are 
more complex for a number of reasons, but this example serves to 
illustrate the basic framework under discussion. 
A related concept is steganography which is employed to hide 
the very existence of a message from the third party.
3
  Thinking back 
to our example of Alice and Bob, imagine that Bob not only wants to 
convey a message to Alice via a publicly observable medium, but also 
wants to do it in such a way that observers do not realize a message 
 
 2. SIMON SINGH, THE CODE BOOK: THE SCIENCE OF SECRECY FROM ANCIENT EGYPT 
TO QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY 6 (2000). 
 3. Id. at 5. 
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was transmitted.  Again, in private, Bob and Alice will agree on a 
scheme ahead of time.  Then Bob posts some flyers around town 
saying something like, “Join the Springfield Baking Club on Friday, 
October 20, for a baking presentation, to be held at the Basketball 
court on 3rd and Spruce.  Rain or shine.  We will talk about 
sourdough and tofu breads.”  Because Bob and Alice agreed that the 
message will be conveyed via the number of non-whitespace 
characters in a flyer about the Springfield Baking Club, Alice 
correctly gets the message of “163” and subtracts 143 to get the real 
message of 20.  We assume that they agreed to keep the same 
encryption scheme as before.  Everyone else can observe the message, 
but doesn't know there was a secret message hidden within, or who it 
was intended for. 
Modern encryption software can be roughly categorized into 
“file-level encryption” and “disk-level encryption.”  File-level 
encryption allows the user to encrypt the contents of individual files.  
The presence of the file and the file metadata—filename, modification 
and access dates, file size—remain available to an attacker who gains 
possession of the storage medium.  Email encryption software, such 
as GNU Privacy Guard (GPG), falls into this category, since each 
email is encrypted individually for transmission.  The existence of the 
message as well as the sender and recipient are known to observers.  
Disk-level encryption creates an encrypted container on the entire 
disk so that all files stored are automatically encrypted into one giant 
glob of bits.  An attacker might suspect that the disk is not just filled 
with gibberish and is likely encrypted, but would have no idea as to 
the number and size of the files on the disk, if any, their names, or 
possible content.  Some software, such as TrueCrypt, goes a step 
further and allows the creation of nested hidden volumes.  Even if the 
key/passphrase is revealed for the outer volume, there is no way to 
tell if there are interior encrypted volumes with more data.
4
 
Free and open source encryption software, along with the 
knowledge of how to use it, is available to anyone with an Internet 
connection. Without a passkey, it is impossible to decrypt data where 
there is properly implemented, strong encryption software. Even law 
enforcement agencies with large budgets and access to significant 
computing power cannot decrypt such data.  Where traditional 
intelligence gathering and wiretapping techniques fail or are not 
attempted prior to arrest, it has become necessary to seek cooperation 
 
 4. See Hidden Volume, TRUECRYPT, http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/hidden-
volume#Y0 (last visited Nov. 2, 2013). 
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from defendants to divulge their passkeys despite assertions of Fifth 
Amendment privilege. 
The earliest Fifth Amendment encryption issue surfaced in 
connection with the prosecution of Edward Leary, a disgruntled 
computer analyst who planted two homemade gasoline bombs on a 
train in Manhattan in December 1994, injuring dozens of people.
5
  In 
the course of pretrial hearings, Leary refused to divulge his computer 
password for “personal reasons” as his attorneys argued that such 
disclosure would violate Leary’s Fifth Amendment rights.6  The 
prosecution, in turn, asserted that self-incrimination was not at issue 
since the requested “[code] words themselves don’t create evidence.”7  
Judge Rena Uviller did not rule from the bench immediately, although 
she analogized the request “to breaking a lock on a diary while 
exercising a search warrant.”8  Ultimately, no judicial decision was 
issued as the state’s forensics team was able to break Leary’s 
password without his assistance.
9
 
I propose that there are four types of fact scenarios which can 
arise in the application of Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination to encrypted content.  All of these permutations may be 
encountered in situations where it may be necessary to seek a court 
order compelling a defendant to divulge his passkey on penalty of 
civil or criminal contempt.  They are as follows: (1) content altogether 
inaccessible and the substance of which is unknown, (2) content 
initially accessible by law enforcement personnel which subsequently 
became cryptographically inaccessible, (3) inaccessible content, the 
substance of which later becomes collaterally apparent from other 
sources, (4) content which becomes accessible after a duly issued 
court order.  Each of these scenarios requires a somewhat different 
approach under current jurisprudence and, ultimately, a better 
understanding of the nature of encryption and its relationship to self-
incrimination.   
II. BASIC OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT JURISPRUDENCE 
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution reads, in relevant 
 
 5. George James, Man Convicted in Bombings on Subway, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1996, at 
B4. 
 6. Barbara Ross, Bomb Suspect Won’t Yield Code, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 12, 1996, at 
22. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Interview with Peter Casolaro, Assistant Dist. Attorney, N.Y. Cnty. (Feb. 4, 2013). 
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part, that “[n]o person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself.”10  The early impetus for this privilege was 
the prevention of confessions obtained through duress or torture.
11
  It 
is also thought to logically flow from the fact that “the American 
system of criminal prosecution is accusatorial, not inquisitorial, and 
that the Fifth Amendment privilege is its essential mainstay.”12  The 
scope of the privilege encompasses all incriminating evidence used to 
establish the accused’s guilt—such evidence must be “independently 
and freely secured, and may not by coercion prove a charge against an 
accused out of his own mouth.”13 
The privilege, however, does not treat an individual as a “witness 
against himself” under all circumstances.  It “protects an accused only 
from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide 
the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature.”14  
To be deemed “testimonial,” the person’s “communication must 
itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose 
information.”15 
As to documentary and physical evidence, the Fifth Amendment 
applies to disclosures which are (1) compelled, (2) involve a 
testimonial act, and (3) tend to incriminate the person so compelled.
16
  
Additionally, even if documentary evidence is not in itself 
testimonial, the act of production may be sufficiently testimonial to 
give rise to Fifth Amendment protections.
17
 
 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 11. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 447 (1956) (“[T]here are indications in 
the debates on the Constitution that the evil to be remedied was the use of torture to exact 
confessions.”). 
 12. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964); see also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 
U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (“It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our 
unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, 
perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial, rather than an inquisitorial, system of 
criminal justice . . . .”). 
 13. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8.  The privilege is construed to include not only those 
proceedings where a person’s testimony is sought in his own criminal prosecution, but also “that 
a person shall not be compelled, when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony 
which may tend to show that he himself has committed a crime.”  Counselman v. Hitchcock, 
142 U.S. 547, 547 (1892). 
 14. Doe v. United States (Doe I), 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988) (requiring defendant to sign a 
consent form authorizing foreign banks to disclose any and all accounts which defendant may 
have with the banks does not violate the Fifth Amendment). 
 15. Id. 
 16. United States v. Authement, 607 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1979) (production of brass 
knuckles). 
 17. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976) (“The act of producing evidence in 
response to a subpoena nevertheless has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from 
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Two recent oft-cited Supreme Court decisions inform the 
discussion on self-incrimination through compelled production of 
documents by the defendant.  In Fisher, defendant taxpayers had 
given certain tax documents prepared by their accountants to their 
attorneys in the course of two IRS investigations.
18
  The IRS sought 
production of these documents from the taxpayers’ attorneys.19  The 
Supreme Court held, in relevant part, that the documents were not 
entitled to Fifth Amendment protection and, more importantly, that 
the act of production itself is not testimonial because in that particular 
instance “implicitly admitting the existence and possession of the 
papers [does not rise] to the level of testimony within the protection 
of the Fifth Amendment.”20  As a practical matter, “[t]he existence 
and location of the papers are a foregone conclusion and the taxpayer 
adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government’s 
information by conceding that he in fact has the papers.”21 
The flip side of Fisher is Hubbell where, subsequent to a grant of 
immunity by the Government, the defendant produced thousands of 
pages of documents pursuant to a grand jury subpoena.
22
  In 
dismissing the grand jury indictment based in part on the content of 
the immunized documents, the Supreme Court held that the foregone 
conclusion rationale did not apply to the defendant’s production 
(which was also entitled to derivative use immunity) because “the 
Government has not shown that it had any prior knowledge of either 
the existence or the whereabouts of the [documents] ultimately 
produced.”23 
The Court further held that with respect to the defendant’s 
response to the broadly worded eleven categories of documents 
sought by the subpoena requests, the collation and gathering of 
documents necessarily required the defendant to divulge “the contents 
of his own mind” and that such production was akin to “telling an 
inquisitor the combination to a wall safe, not like being forced to 
surrender the key to a strongbox.”24 
Even if a defendant or witness exercises his right against self-
 
the contents of the papers produced.”).  See also United States v. Doe (Doe II), 465 U.S. 605, 
612 (1984) (production of subpoenaed records of a sole proprietorship). 
 18. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 394. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 411. 
 21. Id. (emphasis added). 
 22. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000). 
 23. Id. at 44-45. 
 24. Id. at 43. 
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incrimination in appropriate circumstances, he can still be compelled 
to testify when granted use and derivative use immunity pursuant to 
18 U.S.C Section 6002 or similar state statutes.  The Supreme Court 
has held that such immunity is “coextensive with the privilege and 
suffices to supplant it.”25  State practice differs and may provide for 
more or less protection than the federal rules.
26
 
III. INACCESSIBLE AND UNKNOWN CONTENT 
Very few courts, and no circuit court prior to 2012, have dealt 
with compulsion of disclosure of encrypted data in decrypted form.  
Those courts struggled with the nature of encryption.  They also 
struggled with the consequences of and differences in compelling a 
defendant to produce either the unencrypted content, or the passwords 
that would allow the Government to access the unencrypted content. 
The most recent circuit court case represents the first scenario 
proposed and, perhaps, the easiest to resolve on the facts alone. 
A. Facts and Legal Issues 
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011 
(Doe) from the Eleventh Circuit is the latest and the only appellate 
decision to date that discusses the issues head on.
27
  The case arose 
out of a lawful seizure of several hard drives allegedly belonging to 
the defendant (Doe) during a child pornography investigation.
28
  In 
the course of the investigation, law enforcement officers determined 
that Doe accessed the Internet from Internet Protocol addresses 
assigned to certain hotels.
 29
  Eventually, the officers applied for a 
search warrant to Doe’s room when he was tracked to a hotel in 
California.
30
  In the process of executing the search warrant, several 
large external hard drives and other storage media were seized.
31
  
When the Government’s forensic examiners attempted to analyze the 
data on the hard drives, they were unable to access certain portions of 
 
 25. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972). 
 26. Absent a waiver, New York State automatically provides for transactional immunity 
to witnesses testifying in a legal proceeding, such as in front of a Grand Jury.  See N.Y. CRIM. 
PROC. LAW §§ 50.10, 190.40. 
 27. In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011 (United States v. 
Doe), 670 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 28. Id. at 1339. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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those drives because they were strongly encrypted.
32
 
As a result, the Government sought and obtained a grand jury 
subpoena, requiring Doe to “produce the unencrypted contents of the 
digital media, and any and all containers or folders thereon.”33  Doe 
challenged the subpoena on Fifth Amendment self-incrimination 
grounds.
34
  To overcome the challenge, the Government requested 
that Doe be granted immunity “limited to the use [of Doe’s] act of 
production of the unencrypted contents.”35  The district court granted 
the Government’s request.36  Nevertheless, Doe, appearing before the 
grand jury, refused to decrypt the hard drives on Fifth Amendment 
grounds because the grant of immunity did not cover derivative use of 
his testimony, i.e., the decryption.
37
  At the order to show cause 
hearing, Doe argued that the Government at trial would need to prove 
that “(1) the hard drives belonged to [him] (which was not in dispute) 
and (2) contained child pornography.”38  Since the grant of immunity 
was limited to act-of-production immunity, proving the second point 
would be a result of the derivative use of his testimony since “by 
decrypting the contents, he would be testifying that he, as opposed to 
some other person, placed the contents on the hard drive, encrypted 
the contents, and could retrieve and examine them whenever he 
wished.”39  The district court did not accept Doe’s position, finding 
that Doe’s decryption and production is not testimonial and found him 
to be in contempt.
40
 
In overturning the lower court, the Eleventh Circuit held that it 
was an error (1) to consider Doe’s decryption and production of hard 
drives as a non-testimonial act not entitled to Fifth Amendment 
protections and (2) to limit the grant of immunity to use immunity 
only, thus allowing the Government derivative use of the contents of 
the hard drives once they are disclosed.
41
 
B. Reasoning 
There was no dispute that the production and decryption of the 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 34. In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 670 F.3d at 1338. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 1339. 
 39. Id. at 1339-40. 
 40. In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 670 F.3d at 1340. 
 41. Id. at 1341. 
FOLKINSHTEYN 4/27/2014  7:32 PM 
2014] A WITNESS AGAINST HIMSELF 385 
data was both compelled and incriminatory within the meaning of the 
Fifth Amendment.
42
  The core of the Doe decision rested on the 
analysis of whether “the Government sought testimony within the 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment” in seeking the production of 
decrypted contents of Doe’s computer.43 
1. Little Protection for Voluntarily Created Documents 
As a general matter, pre-existing documents voluntarily created 
by the person from whom they are sought are not deemed to be 
protected under the Fifth Amendment because their creation was not 
initially compelled.
44
  They are not protected despite the fact that they 
may contain incriminating statements, since the privilege “protects a 
person only against being incriminated by his compelled testimonial 
communications.”45  Thus, the court had no difficulty determining 
that as a threshold matter “the files, if there are any at all in the hidden 
portions of the hard drives, are not themselves testimonial.”46 
Despite the non-testimonial nature of the files themselves, under 
certain circumstances the act of production may have sufficient 
communicative qualities apart from the underlying documents sought, 
triggering Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination.  
Thus, constitutional privileges may be implicated where 
“[c]ompliance with a subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the 
papers demanded and their possession or control by the [party]” or 
where production would indicate the party’s “belief that the papers 
are those described in the subpoena.”47 
2. Application of Act of Production Principles to          
Encrypted Contents 
In applying the principles spelled out in Fisher and Hubble 
(discussed in Part II above), the Eleventh Circuit in Doe reasoned that 
under the foregone conclusion principle “where the location, 
existence and authenticity of the purported evidence is known with 
reasonable particularity, the contents of the individual’s mind are not 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1342. 
 44. See, e.g., Doe II, 465 U.S. 605, 611-12 (1984).  This so-called “private papers” 
doctrine has drastically evolved since the early years of American jurisprudence when such 
documents were considered to be protected both under the Fourth and the Fifth Amendments.  
See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 45. United States v. Fisher, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976). 
 46. United States v. Doe (Doe III), 670 F.3d 1335, 1342 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 47. Doe II, 465 U.S. at 612-13 (1984) (citations omitted) (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410). 
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used against him, and therefore no Fifth Amendment protection is 
available.”48  At the same time, an act of production may be 
testimonial where it conveys “some explicit or implicit statement of 
fact” of the alleged material’s existence within the individual’s 
possession or the material’s authenticity.49  The court thus used a two-
step approach in tackling the encryption problem.  To be deemed non-
testimonial, an act of production must arise from (1) an individual 
being compelled to perform a physical act rather than “make use of 
the contents of his or her mind,” for example, to produce a key to a 
safe containing documents, or (2) the testimonial aspects of 
production are defeated by the “foregone conclusion” doctrine.50 
Under the above framework, the court disagreed with the 
Government that requiring Doe to produce the unencrypted contents 
would be akin to requiring Doe to produce a key to a lockbox—
“nothing more than a physical non-testimonial transfer.”51  The court 
reasoned that “requiring Doe to use a decryption password is most 
certainly akin to requiring the production of a combination” as it 
demands him to produce the “contents of his mind.”52  More 
importantly, however, the act of production would also carry 
testimonial implications that Doe has “knowledge of the existence 
and location of potentially incriminating files; of his possession, 
control and access to the encrypted portions of the drives; and of his 
capability to decrypt the files.”53 
Turning to the second exception, the court held that unlike in 
Fisher, the testimonial aspects of Doe’s production were not a 
“foregone conclusion.”  The foregone conclusion doctrine operates to 
defeat the constitutional ramifications of acts of production where the 
testimonial aspects are otherwise known to the Government.
54
  Thus, 
the witness’s concessions add “little or nothing to the sum total of the 
Government’s information.”55  In compelling a witness to testify 
under such circumstances, “no constitutional rights are touched[; t]he 
question is not of testimony, but of surrender.”56 
 
 48. Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1344. 
 49. Id. at 1345. 
 50. Id. at 1345-46. 
 51. Id. at 1346. 
 52. Id. See also In re Boucher, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009), for 
its narrowed subpoena request in Boucher, infra Section IV.A, note 63. 
 53. Id. 
 54. United States v. Fisher, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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While the Government was able to demonstrate that “the 
combined storage space of the drives could contain files that number 
well into the millions” it was unable to show that “the drives actually 
contain any files, nor has it shown which of the estimated twenty 
million files the drives are capable of holding may prove useful.”57  
While the IRS, in Fisher, was fully aware of the specific documents 
(though, not necessarily all of them) it sought and knew that they 
were in the possession of the taxpayers’ attorneys, the Government 
here could not show that “it possessed even a remotely similar level 
of knowledge of the files on the hard drives at the time it attempted to 
compel production from Doe.”58  Even though exact specificity in 
subpoena requests is not required, “categorical requests for 
documents the Government anticipates are likely to exist simply will 
not suffice.”59 
As a result, the court found that the Government was unable to 
carry its burden under the foregone conclusion exception “to show 
any basis, let alone shown a basis with reasonable particularity, for its 
belief that encrypted files exist on the drives, that Doe has access to 
those files, or that he is capable of decrypting the files.”60 
3. Limited Immunity Was Not Sufficient 
The remainder of the court’s opinion reversing the district 
court’s civil contempt order against Doe was thus predetermined.  
Since Doe’s act of production was sufficiently testimonial to warrant 
Fifth Amendment self-incrimination protections, the district court’s 
grant, per the Government’s request of only use immunity, to compel 
Doe to testify was improper because such limited immunity is not co-
extensive with the privilege against self-incrimination.
61
  Relying on 
Kastigar v. U.S., the court reasoned that only “use and derivative use 
immunity establishes the critical threshold to overcome an 
individual’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.”62  It was not sufficient for the Government to request 
and for the district court to grant such limited immunity to compel 
 
 57. Doe III, 670 F.3d 1335, 1347 (11th Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original).  The nature of 
the encryption program in this case, TrueCrypt, was such that it would also encrypt any unused 
space rendering any distinction between unused space and actual data impossible to determine.  
Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 1349. 
 61. Id. at 1350. 
 62. Id. at 1351 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972)). 
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Doe’s production since the files thus decrypted could still be used 
against him and they are “directly or indirectly derived from” 
compelled testimony.
63
 
IV. INACCESSIBLE BUT “KNOWN” CONTENT 
The two cases highlighted here represent Scenarios II and III, 
respectively.  They are conceptually more nuanced and the 
correctness of the outcome in each situation is more debatable.  To 
the extent that each holding may be jurisprudentially sound, questions 
still remain as to whether the outcomes would have been the same had 
the Eleventh Circuit case (discussed in Part III) preceded these two 
decisions.  The third case straddles the two categories.  However, it 
was ultimately resolved without a final judicial ruling and thus it still 
remains to be seen how the Eleventh Circuit framework would play 
out at the district court level. 
A. Grand Jury Subpoena to Sebastian Boucher 
The facts of Grand Jury Subpoena to Sebastian Boucher (In re 
Boucher) arose out of a border search and a seizure of Boucher’s 
laptop as he was entering the U.S. by car from Canada.
64
  When 
Boucher’s laptop (which he admitted to be his) was inspected at 
secondary screening, the inspector conducting the screening observed 
that the computer contained over 40,000 images, some of which 
appeared to be involving child pornography based on their file 
names.
65
  After being given Miranda warnings, Boucher directed the 
border agents to the location on his hard drive where he stored 
pornographic material.
66
  A further inspection of that location on the 
hard drive, led to the finding of a number of videos and images that 
appeared to involve child pornography, at which point Boucher was 
arrested, and his laptop was seized and shut down.
67
  When a forensic 
 
 63. Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1351. 
 64. In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009).  
Generally, the border search doctrine provides an exception to Fourth Amendment’s protections 
against unreasonable search and seizure.  Thus, “[s]earches of closed containers and their 
contents can be conducted at the border without particularized suspicion under the Fourth 
Amendment.”  United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008).  This includes computers 
and files contained therein.  Id.  Under the border search doctrine, electronic media may be 
seized and transported away from the border for further forensic analysis for a limited period of 
time.  See, e.g., United States v. Cotterman, 637 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 65. In re Boucher, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006, at *4. 
 66. Id. at *5. 
 67. Id. 
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examination was attempted at a later time and the computer was 
rebooted, the particular portion of the hard drive containing 
pornography was found to be encrypted by Pretty Good Privacy 
(PGP), an encryption program, and thus, inaccessible.
68
  As a result, 
the Government applied for and received a grand jury subpoena 
directing Boucher to produce the password.
69
  At a later date, the 
request was narrowed to require Boucher only “to produce an 
unencrypted version of the [drive.]”70 
The district court held that the testimonial nature which may 
have existed with respect to the incriminatory act of production was 
superseded by the Government’s knowledge of the existence and 
location of the documents as per the foregone conclusion doctrine.
71
 
Here, Boucher admitted that the computer was his at secondary 
screening and, more importantly, accessed the drive in the presence of 
the border agents who observed the general character of the files 
present on the drive, including images of potential child 
pornography.
72
 
In a holding that appears more permissive in applying the 
foregone conclusion doctrine, the district court observed that the 
doctrine “does not require that the government be aware of the 
incriminating contents of the files; it requires that the government 
demonstrate with reasonable particularity that it knows the existence 
and location of subpoenaed documents.”73 
The conditions in In re Boucher as to the Government’s 
knowledge were not present in the Doe decision.  To the extent that it 
needed distinguishing, the Eleventh Circuit observed that although the 
Government need not have shown that it knew of the contents of the 
files it sought in In re Boucher, a showing of the Government’s 
knowledge that the files actually exist was still required thereunder.
74
  
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at *6.  Government experts specifically testified that they were unable to access 
the relevant drive.  Id. at *5. 
 70. In re Boucher, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006, at *6. 
 71. Id. at *10. 
 72. Id. at *9. 
 73. Id. at *8.  In doing so, the district court overturned the Magistrate’s finding that the 
foregone conclusion did not apply because the government did not see every file on the drive 
and therefore it did not know whether most files were incriminating.  Id.  Nonetheless, the 
district court prohibited the Government from using Boucher’s act of production in their case to 
authenticate the contents.  Id. 
 74. Doe III, 670 F.3d 1335, 1349 (11th Cir. 2011).  Thus, in Boucher, the Government 
need not have shown what was contained in a file labeled “2yo getting raped during diaper 
change;” it was “crucial that the Government knew that there existed a file with such a name.”  
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Further, there was no indication that the Government, “at the time it 
sought to compel production [by Doe], knew to any degree of 
particularity, what, if anything, was hidden behind the encrypted 
wall.”75 The Eleventh Circuit seems to also require some independent 
knowledge (as opposed to mere suspicion) as to the contents, in 
addition to the location and the existence of the subpoenaed 
documents.
76
  Such a limitation was apparent in the reasoning of the 
Boucher court inasmuch as it did find that the border agents were 
initially able to view certain files and “ascertained that they may 
consist of images or videos of child pornography.”77 
Under either approach, the fact that decryption
78
 and production 
of the unencrypted data may provide the Government with additional 
incriminating information as yet unknown to it is not necessarily 
relevant for Fifth Amendment purposes.
79
  So long as the Government 
makes the relevant threshold showing of knowledge, the potential for 
revelation of additional information is not a bar to production.
80
 
B. United States v. Fricosu 
In United States v. Fricosu,
81
 Ramona Fricosu (along with her 
ex-husband) was accused of engaging in certain fraudulent real estate 
transactions and money laundering.
82
  In executing a search warrant 
 
Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Doe’s act of production would be very similar to Hubbell’s inasmuch as prior to the 
act of production; the Government has no knowledge as to the documents’ existence.  Thus, 
while the contents themselves are non-testimonial in nature (since their creation was not 
compelled), the testimonial nature of the act of production which reveals the documents’ 
existence requires both use and derivative use immunity to meet the requirements of Kastigar. 
 77. In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006, at *9 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 
2009). 
 78. Perhaps even the provision of a password may be compelled under this line of cases, 
though it seems likely that such a request would be deemed a “product of the mind” in itself and 
thus protected directly under the Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665, 666 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (quashing grand 
jury subpoena which called for defendant “to provide all passwords used or associated with 
the . . . computer . . . and any files.”). 
 79. See Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1347 (“Case law from the Supreme Court does not demand 
that the Government identify exactly the documents it seeks, but it does require some specificity 
in its requests – categorical requests for documents the Government anticipates are likely to 
exist simply will not suffice.”).  This topic is discussed later in Section VI. 
 80. Compare United States v. Kim, 677 F. Supp. 2d 930 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (Fourth 
Amendment and encrypted data) with United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 81. United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Colo. 2012). 
 82. See Indictment, United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, (D. Colo. 2012) (No. 
10-CR-00509). 
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on her property, the FBI seized a number of computers ostensibly 
belonging to Fricosu and others in her household.
83
  One laptop 
computer found in Fricosu’s bedroom and tagged electronically with 
her name was found to be encrypted with PGP.
84
  As was the case in 
Boucher, the Government was unable to decrypt it on its own.
85
  As a 
result, they sought a writ requiring Fricosu to produce the contents of 
the encrypted drive based in particular on an intercepted conversation 
that Fricosu had with her incarcerated husband in which she said, in 
relevant part, that “it was on my laptop” and that she may have 
encrypted it.
86
 
Relying on the reasoning in Boucher, the court held that 
Fricosu’s act of production would not be sufficiently testimonial 
based on the doctrine of foregone conclusion as the Government met 
its burden of proof in showing that the laptop in question either 
belonged to Fricosu or Fricosu was the sole user thereof and that she 
admitted as much during the intercepted conversation.
87
  Additionally, 
although the holding is somewhat unclear and the discussion of the 
elements of the foregone conclusion doctrine is absent, the court 
found that: 
There is little question here but that the government knows of the 
existence and location of the computer’s files.  The fact that it does 
not know the specific content of any specific document is not a 
barrier to production.
88
 
That latter conclusion is not present in Boucher.  Recall in 
Boucher, the border agents were able to ascertain in part the nature of 
a number of the files on Boucher’s computer and, in particular, the 
contraband nature thereof.  There was no indication in Fricosu (and 
there does not appear to be any discussion in the decision as to the 
evidence actually sought and the particularity with which the recorded 
conversation described the contents) that the Government could 
identify with “reasonable particularity” what “it” was.89  Nevertheless, 
 
 83. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. at 1234. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 1235. 
 87. Id. at 1237. 
 88. Id.  
 89. The elements of “reasonable particularity” with respect to electronic data seem to be 
that “(1) the file exists, (2) the file is possessed by the target of the subpoena, and (3) the file is 
authentic.”  See Doe III, 670 F.3d 1335, 1349 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Norwood, 
420 F.3d 888, 895-96 (8th Cir. 2005)).  See also Government’s Application under the All Writs 
Act Requiring Defendant Fricosu to Assist in the Execution of Previously Issued Search 
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just as in Boucher, Fricosu was only offered immunity for the act 
producing the unencrypted documents, not their contents.
90
 
The Eleventh Circuit, in discussing the Fricosu opinion, 
distinguished the case by relying heavily on the recorded conversation 
between Fricosu and her ex-husband.  For all intents and purposes, 
“Fricosu essentially admitted every testimonial communication that 
may have been implicit in the production of the unencrypted 
contents.”91 
Fricosu appealed the finding of the district court.  The Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit did not resolve the question but instead 
rejected the appeal as not ripe for adjudication under the rules of 
finality.
92
  Subsequent to the district court decision, although there 
were some indications by Fricosu’s attorney that she may have 
forgotten or never known the password,
93
 she (or likely her ex-
husband) eventually provided the passwords which then were used 
successfully by the Government to decrypt the laptop.
94
 
 
C.  In the Matter of the Decryption of a Seized Data Storage 
System 
This last criminal case has seen some interesting twists and 
reversals of fortune for both the putative defendant and the federal 
Government.  The facts of the case are fairly run-of-the-mill as set 
forth in the Magistrate’s decision.95  A warrant was issued for Jeffrey 
Feldman’s residence allowing Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) 
agents to enter and search Feldman’s premises for evidence of child 
pornography, including electronic storage media.
96
  In the course of 
 
Warrants, United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, (D. Colo. 2012) (No. 10-CR-00509-
01-REB), available at https://www.eff.org/node/58551 (last visited Apr. 25, 2012).  There is a 
potential argument that this is a very restrictive reading of the lowered thresholds set forth in 
Fischer. 
 90. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1238. 
 91. Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1349, n.27. 
 92. United States v. Fricosu, No. 12-701, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 3561 (10th Cir. Feb. 21, 
2012). 
 93. David Kravets, Defendant Ordered to Decrypt Laptop May Have Forgotten 
Password, WIRED (Feb. 6, 2012, 2:55 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/02/forgotten-password/. 
 94. See Government’s Notice Regarding Compliance with Court’s Order of January 23, 
2012, United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Colo. 2012) (No. 10-CR-00509-REB-
02). 
 95. Order Denying Application to Compel Decryption, In the Matter of the Decryption of 
a Seized Data Storage System, No. 13-M-449 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 19, 2013) (Callahan, J.). 
 96. Id. at 2. 
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the search, before invoking his right to counsel, Feldman, a software 
engineer, stated that he was the sole occupant of the residence 
searched and that he had lived there for over 15 years.
97
 
The FBI seized a number of storage devices, a number of which 
it found to be encrypted.
98
  One of the unencrypted devices was found 
to contain a peer-to-peer file-sharing program, the logs of which 
seemed to indicate that certain files potentially suggestive of child 
pornography were transferred therewith.
99
  Other unencrypted 
computer logs appeared to indicate that the files so-named were 
downloaded to the encrypted devices.
100
 
As a result, the Government applied for an order under the All 
Writs Act to compel Feldman to “assist in the execution of a federal 
search warrant by providing federal law enforcement agents a 
decrypted version of the contents of his encrypted data storage 
system.”101 
 Initially, Magistrate Judge Callahan denied the order sought by 
the Government.  Applying the Eleventh Circuit rubric, the magistrate 
found that although (1) the “existence and location of the [files] are 
foregone conclusion” since circumstantial evidence from unencrypted 
devices indicates presence of child pornography on the encrypted 
devices, (2) Feldman may be capable of accessing the encrypted 
portion of the drives given his computer engineering background and 
his being the sole occupant of the residence searched, as a “close call” 
matter, if compelled: 
Feldman’s act of production which would necessarily require his 
using a password of some type to decrypt the storage device would 
be tantamount to telling the government something it does not 
already know with ‘reasonable particularity’—namely, that 
Feldman has personal access to and control over the encrypted 
storage devices.
102
 
In an interesting twist, however, since Feldman was not charged 
or brought before a grand jury at the time, the Government sought 
reconsideration of its motion on an ex parte basis.
103
  On that motion, 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Order Denying Application to Compel Decryption, In the Matter of the Decryption of 
a Seized Data Storage System, No. 13-M-449 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 19, 2013) (Callahan, J.). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Bruce Vielmetti, Did U.S. Prosecutors Mislead Judge in West Allis Decryption 
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the Government showed that, subsequent to the original order, it was 
able to decrypt on their own a small portion of one of the encrypted 
drives and was able to observe child pornography files as well as 
Feldman’s personal files.104  The Government, thus, argued that this 
discovery mooted any act of production concerns with respect to 
“access and control” and the magistrate judge agreed, holding that “it 
is a ‘foregone conclusion’ that Feldman has access to and control over 
the subject encrypted storage devices.”105  On penalty of contempt, 
Feldman was ordered to assist the Government with decrypting the 
seized encrypted devices.
106
 
This decision, however, did not stand for long.  Upon finding out 
about this ex parte decision, Feldman filed an emergency motion 
seeking a stay of the magistrate’s latest order before the district court, 
arguing, inter alia, that the ex parte nature of the order was 
improper.
107
  Judge Rudolph Randa granted the stay and ordered 
further briefing.
108
  Subsequent briefs have sparred over a number of 
issues, including the propriety of the prosecutors’ actions and, in 
particular, whether they misled the magistrate about the alleged 
complexity of the computer system used by Feldman and Feldman’s 
sophistication as a computer user in seeking to have the original order 
reconsidered.
109
  Ultimately, the Government was able to crack one of 
the drives seized, charged Feldman with possession, distributing or 
receiving child pornography, and dropped its motion to compel 
decryption.
110
 
 
Case?, MILWAUKEE WISCONSIN JOURNAL SENTINEL (July 23, 2013), 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/crime/did-us-prosecutors-mislead-judge-in-west-allis-
decryption-case-b9958202z1-216673531.html.  The title of the article refers back to the original 
search warrant which was filed as In the Matter of the Search of 2051 S. 102nd Street, 
Apartment E, West Allis, No. 13-M-421 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 1, 2013). 
 104. Order Granting Ex Parte Request for Reconsideration of the United States’s 
Application Under the All Writs Act, In the Matter of the Decryption of a Seized Data Storage 
System, No. 13-M-449 (E.D. Wis. May 21, 2013). 
 105. Id. at 3. 
 106. Id. at 4. 
 107. See Declan Mccullagh, Judge: Child Porn Suspect Doesn’t Need to Decrypt Files, 
CNET (June 4, 2013, 2:30 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57587670-38/judge-child-
porn-suspect-doesnt-need-to-decrypt-files/. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See Vielmetti, supra note 103.  For a further discussion of goal-oriented 
exaggerations of computer users’ abilities, see infra Part VII. 
 110. Bruce Vielmetti, Federal Shutdown Slows Milwaukee Porn Encryption Case, but FBI 
Busts Silk Road, MILWAUKEE WISCONSIN JOURNAL SENTINEL (Oct. 3, 2013), 
http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/news/226206611.html; see also Motion to Dismiss Application, 
In re The Decryption of a Seized Data Storage Sys., No. 13-M449 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 16, 2013).  
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This case would have fallen in the gray area between Doe and 
Boucher, though, given the precedent developed prior to this case it 
would have been surprising if Feldman had not been compelled to 
decrypt.  However, since the relevant issue was resolved without a 
final ruling on the facts, it remains to been seen how district courts 
would apply the Eleventh Circuit framework. 
V. WHAT ARE THE LESSONS OF THESE DECISIONS? 
The divergence in the holdings above seems to rest on a number 
of implicit and explicit premises which underlie the first three 
Scenarios set out in Section I.  One critical difference between the 
outcomes in Boucher and Fricosu on one hand, and in Doe on the 
other, is the amount of information revealed by the defendant.  In the 
former two instances, substantial information was arguably made 
apparent to the Government through either initial cooperation by 
Boucher or through tapped telephone conversations, respectively, 
making the finding of foregone conclusion justified.  In the latter 
case, the Government was left wholly grasping at straws. 
More generally, the novel nature of encryption issues seems to 
leave the courts in search of appropriate analogies as to how to apply 
the “private papers” doctrine.  All documents at issue in these cases 
are voluntarily created but, if they are produced in the condition in 
which they are found, would be of no assistance to the fact-finder.  
Although the foregone conclusion doctrine appears to serve as an 
efficient mechanism to resolve certain questions relating to 
encryption, better physical world analogs to the cryptographic process 
are necessary in order to appropriately balance Fifth Amendment 
protections with technological advances. 
A. The Value of Silence 
The decision in Boucher was predetermined by, in particular, the 
border search to which Boucher was subjected and his initial 
cooperation with the border agents which enabled them to actually 
locate and identify the nature of the contraband files on his 
computer.
111
  Similarly, although in Fricosu, as discussed in Part 
IV.B, the holding is arguably less clear and perhaps even misapplies 
Boucher, the defendant’s intercepted conversation with her ex-
husband provided a crucial link to strip Fifth Amendment protections 
from her act of production.  Yet, despite the courts’ finding in both 
 
 111. See supra Part IV.A. 
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cases that the foregone conclusion doctrine defeated the testimonial 
aspects of the act of production (i.e., decryption), both defendants 
were given the benefit of limited immunity for the act of production 
by the district courts.  Implicit in that conclusion is the recognition by 
the courts of the vestigial testimonial nature of production despite the 
contrary ultimate findings.
112
 
Both the Boucher and Fricosu decisions illustrate the application 
of Fifth Amendment principles to Scenarios II and III enumerated 
above.  Contemporaneous knowledge of the contents of encrypted 
data can be used to defeat an assertion of privilege to the act of 
production by way of application of the foregone conclusion 
principle.  Although one may quibble with the opaque reasoning of 
the two cases, the conclusions reached in the two decisions do not 
appear inconsistent with existing jurisprudence.  Ultimately, the 
amount of actual knowledge required to foreclose the assertion of 
privilege is unclear and is likely to be determined on a case-by-case 
basis. 
The Eleventh Circuit decision is illustrative of Scenario I and is 
much better at spelling out its reasoning and providing a seemingly 
straightforward test for when the foregone conclusion operates to 
defeat the defendant’s exercise of his right against self-incrimination.  
For the first time at the appellate level, the Eleventh Circuit held that 
decryption and production of encrypted files is not a physical act of 
non-testimonial nature, akin to providing a key to a lockbox or a 
handwriting sample.
113
  Although the physical comparisons to digital 
encryption do seem to be lacking,
114
 it certainly is a step in the right 
direction in recognizing the complexity of the digital age.  It remains 
to be seen how the test would operate under circumstances which are 
not as clear-cut and straightforward, particularly when the putative 
defendant may not have been as careful about remaining steadfastly 
silent. 
Additionally, the identity of the owner of the storage media was 
not really in question in any of the three cases that were resolved with 
finality.  Thus, under the rubric of the foregone conclusion doctrine, 
the elimination of the testimonial aspect of production indicating to 
 
 112. It is particularly notable here that the grant of immunity occurred regardless of the 
apparent foregone conclusion as to the testimonial aspects of production.  Cf. Doe II, 465 U.S. 
605, 613 (1984) (“Unlike the Court in Fisher, we have the explicit finding of the District Court 
that the act of producing the documents would involve testimonial self-incrimination.”). 
 113. Doe III, 670 F.3d 1335, 1346 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 114. See discussion infra Part V.B. 
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whom the hardware belonged was obviously not sufficient, standing 
alone, to overcome constitutional objections.  What was in dispute, 
particularly in Doe, was the Government’s knowledge as to the 
contents or, alternatively, the nature or the existence of the contents 
themselves.  In other words, the focus in Fricosu was primarily on the 
physical location and existence of the potentially incriminating 
information, which was ascertained from collateral sources, namely, 
an intercepted phone call. In Doe, on the other hand, and likely in 
future cases dealing with encryption issues, the discussion focused in 
particular on how the Government can meet its burden of showing 
with reasonable particularity its “level of knowledge as to the files on 
the hard drives at the time it attempt[s] to compel production.”115 In 
light of Hubbell, such knowledge must have an independent 
confirmation.
116
 
In a way, these cases represent two extremes of the foregone 
conclusion spectrum.  In particular, Boucher (and to a lesser extent 
Fricosu) is on one end where location and content are known while 
Doe is on the other end where the content is not known.  Doe is the 
classic example of when the foregone conclusion doctrine cannot 
apply in light of the Government’s inability to demonstrate any 
showing of knowledge of the relevant facts to defeat the defendant’s 
assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
B. The Nature of Encryption 
The Doe decision is particularly notable for the fact that the 
court explicitly recognized that encryption by itself cannot be viewed 
as an act carrying a bad intent.  The court noted that: 
We are not persuaded by the suggestion that simply because the 
devices were encrypted necessarily means that Doe was trying to 
hide something.  Just as a vault is capable of storing mountains of 
incriminating documents, that alone does not mean that it contains 
incriminating documents, or anything at all.
117
 
There are numerous private legitimate uses for encryption, 
ranging from protection against identity theft or data theft to 
protection of information for personal reasons.  In some states, certain 
businesses are mandated by law to encrypt personal consumer data, 
 
 115. Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1347 (emphasis in original). 
 116. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 29 (2000). 
 117. Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1347. 
FOLKINSHTEYN  4/27/2014  7:32 PM 
398 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 30 
for example, in Massachusetts and Nevada.
118
  Some jurisdictions 
have even obliquely observed that it may be incumbent upon the legal 
profession to utilize encryption in order to protect clients’ confidences 
under the rules of professional conduct.
119
 
As discussed, Courts faced with the issue of encryption have 
relied on the Fifth Amendment framework applicable to physical 
world analogs.  As a general matter, courts begin their analysis by 
consistently holding that the private papers line of cases applies to the 
underlying unencrypted documents—inasmuch as their initial creation 
was obviously voluntary—be they tax papers,120 images of child 
pornography,
121
 or business records.
122
  The courts then continue by 
observing (as the Eleventh Circuit decision has recognized) that the 
password itself is testimonial in nature, in the way a combination to a 
safe box is testimonial, refusing to accept the key and lock 
approach.
123
 
Whether encrypted files should be treated similarly to other 
voluntarily created documents is, however, a question worth 
 
 118. Miriam Wugmeister, New Massachusetts Regulation Requires Encryption of Portable 
Devices and Comprehensive Data, MORRISON & FOERSTER (Sept. 23, 2008), 
http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/bulletins/14495.html. 
 119. New York City Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 1994-11 (1994) (“A lawyer should exercise 
caution when engaging in conversations containing or concerning client confidences or secrets 
by cellular or cordless telephones or other communication devices readily capable of 
interception, and should consider taking steps sufficient to ensure the security of such 
conversations.”).  In Texas, the Computer and Technology Section of the State Bar recommends 
that attorneys use encryption software to avoid running afoul of consumer data breach 
notification laws or ethical requirements of keeping client confidences. Jason Smith, Ron 
Chichester, & Michael Peck, Keeping Client Data and Your Law License Secure, 76 TEX. BAR 
J. 103, 104 (2013).  Given the scienter requirement of Texas’s Rule 1.05 relating to confidential 
information, an attorney may be subject to discipline if he loses an electronic device containing 
confidential client information or such a device is seized by the government at the border.  Id.  
To teach attorneys about encryption, the Computer and Technology Section held a hands-on 
workshop at the State Bar Annual Meeting, providing attendees with a copy of TrueCrypt and 
other similar applications.  Id. 
 120. United States v. Fisher, 425 U.S. 391, 408-09 (1976) (stating that tax and accounting 
documents voluntarily created should not ordinarily be protected from disclosure).  Although the 
Fisher court punted on the ultimate question of actually overruling Boyd, “the papers demanded 
here are not [the taxpayer’s] ‘private papers.’” Id. at 414. 
 121. See, e.g., In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006 (D. Vt. Feb. 
19, 2009);  Doe III, 670 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Pearson, No. 1:04-
CR-340, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32982 (N.D.N.Y. May 24, 2006). 
 122. Doe II, 465 U.S. 605, 611 (1984). 
 123. Same situation seems to have played out in other cases where the Government 
appears to have specifically sought the underlying unencrypted contents rather than the 
passwords themselves.  See, e.g., United States v. Kirschner, No. 09-MC-50872, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 30603 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2010). 
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considering in light of the potential conceptual difference between the 
creation of the original and the encrypted copy.
124
  A number of 
analogies have been proposed for encryption in this context including 
encryption as translation, as a safe, as well as a “shredded safe.”125  It 
has been argued that none of these analogies standing alone prevent 
compelling of a witness to produce decrypted contents under 
appropriate circumstances with an appropriately worded subpoena.
126
  
But these analogies do provide avenues (both for the prosecution and 
the defense) for arguing when such compelled production rises (or 
does not rise) to the level of a testimonial act of production requiring 
both use and derivative use immunity. 
1. As Translation 
The encryption as translation analogy proposes that an 
encryption algorithm acts on a document as a process of mechanical 
translation, turning an original voluntarily created plaintext document 
into a ciphertext incomprehensible to anyone but the document’s 
creator.
127
  Even though the analogy may be unsuccessful inasmuch as 
the original character of the document arguably remains unchanged 
(once the decryption algorithm is applied) and all electronic 
documents by definition require “translation” from their essential 
nature as 1s and 0s into readable documents by means of 
hardware/software,
128
 it may be useful in conceptualizing when 
translation can be a testimonial act.  As we have seen above, courts 
have generally accepted that an individual’s act of production of an 
unencrypted document is of a testimonial nature inasmuch as it 
implicitly acknowledges that the individual is able to “read” the 
encrypted document, although such testimonial aspects may be 
defeated by the application of the foregone conclusion doctrine. 
This recognition also bears parallel examples in the physical 
realm.  In U.S. v. Ragauskas, a deponent invoked his right against 
self-incrimination “in refusing to translate a document presented to 
 
 124. Nathan K. McGregor, The Weak Protection of Strong Encryption: Passwords, 
Privacy and Fifth Amendment Privilege, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 581, 599 (2010). 
 125. Id. at 600-05. 
 126. Id.; see also Philip R. Reitinger, Compelled Production of Plaintext and Keys, 1996 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171 (1996) (holding plaintext should be treated the same way as ciphertext). 
 127. Production of the ciphertext (a voluntarily created document itself) would thus be in 
compliance with a potential subpoena and nothing more would be required. 
 128. See McGregor, supra note 124, at 604; see also Reitinger, supra note 126, at 176 
(“[L]egal status of encrypted documents should be no different from any other machine-readable 
or machine-translatable records.”). 
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him for inspection” as well as in refusing to answer questions 
pertaining to his activities with the Lithuanian military during World 
War II, his date of birth, the number of languages he speaks and 
similar issues.
129
  Although the decision leaves a lot to be desired in 
terms of clarity on this issue, the court held that Ragauskas was 
entitled to invoke the privilege because information thus obtained 
could be incriminating as it might “demonstrate that Ragauskas 
belonged to the Lithuanian military units that allegedly committed 
atrocities during World War II.”130 
A similar analysis should also apply not only to documents 
written in a foreign language and a witness’s understanding thereof, 
but documents originally written in code.  Contrary to a situation 
where a document is converted into ciphertext from a plaintext 
original, compelling a witness to produce a deciphered version of the 
document would not only be precluded by the Fifth Amendment’s 
protections of an individual’s “product of the mind” but also the 
prohibitions spelled out in Fisher and Hubbell against compulsory 
creation of new documents.
131
  Further, neither the voluntary nature of 
the document’s creation nor the foregone conclusion doctrine would 
be applicable in a case like this—whether or not the Government has 
any independent knowledge as to the individual’s ability to 
understand the cipher or to read a document would generally not have 
any bearing on its ability to compel the individual to forgo the 
exercise of his Fifth Amendment privilege.  To the extent that an 
original plaintext document is innocently (yet purposefully) destroyed 
subsequent to the creation of a ciphertext, similar reasoning should 
apply.
132
 
2. As a Coded Safe or Keyed Lockbox 
This analogy posits that encryption acts similarly to placing 
plaintext documents into a safe locked either by means of a key or a 
combination.
133
  In the Eleventh Circuit decision, the court held that 
requiring an individual to use a decryption password “is most 
 
 129. United States v. Ragauskas, No. 94 C 2325, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2313, at *2 (N.D. 
Ill. Feb. 23, 1995). 
 130. Id. at 11. 
 131. See, e.g., McGregor, supra note 124, at 600 (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 
391, 409 (1976)). 
 132. Interesting questions may arise—thankfully beyond the scope of the paper—as to 
what effect mandatory document retention policies or willful destruction of documents has on 
the issues discussed here. 
 133. See McGregor, supra note 124, at 601. 
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certainly more akin to requiring the production of a combination 
because both demand the use of the contents of the mind.”134  
Moreover, the court recognized that the Government’s requests for 
production or subpoenas in such circumstances are never about the 
password or key in itself—the ultimate goal is the production of the 
“files being withheld”—further strengthening the combination 
analogy.
135
 
There is an underlying assumption in this analogy that, as is 
evidenced by the application of the foregone conclusion principles, 
the nature of the documents thus locked does not change—the 
original still remains intact, so to speak, waiting to be unlocked.
136
  
The conservation of the original document is, however, questionable 
to the extent that the application of the encryption algorithm 
transforms the original into incomprehensible ciphertext absent the 
reversal of the process (with or without the creator’s input).137  The 
ciphertext can be produced and viewed in tangible form and it is, for 
all intents and purposes, the only document that exists until 
mechanical mathematical manipulation is applied to it to make it 
comprehensible.  For example, in Doe, in seeking to establish that 
certain files actually existed on the drive, “the Government introduced 
an exhibit with nonsensical characters and numbers, which it argued 
revealed the encrypted form of data that it seeks.”138 
Court decisions to date have stopped their analysis here by 
simply holding that compelling an individual’s use of the contents of 
his mind to decrypt the contents of the drive and provide the same to 
Government is a testimonial act (which may or may not be defeated 
by the foregone conclusion principles).  However, that approach may 
be problematic for constitutional purposes because it arguably fails to 
recognize the dual physical and mental nature of the act of decryption. 
The analogy may also be unsatisfactory (to both proponents and 
opponents of strong encryption) in its lack of recognition of (1) the 
differences between mechanically securing content in a safe as 
compared to cryptographically by encryption, and (2) the essentially 
unlimited breadth of content which may be stored cryptographically 
as compared to documents stored within the physical limitations of a 
 
 134. Doe III, 670 F.3d 1335, 1346 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 135. See McGregor, supra note 124, at 601. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 602 (calling this the “shredded safe analogy”). 
 138. Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1340. 
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coded safe.
139
  Law enforcement personnel can always gain access to 
a coded safe by mechanical means if a defendant fails to comply with 
a court order to provide combination thereto or even without seeking 
such compulsion.  However, a strongly encrypted drive is often 
unlikely to be breached without a defendant’s cooperation.  At the 
same time, the increasing use of electronically stored information for 
a variety of licit and illicit purposes creates an incentive to properly 
secure such data by encryption on the one hand and increases its value 
to those who seek to gain access to it, on the other.  The physical 
parameters of mechanical safe storage, on the other hand, necessarily 
limit the exposure of content compelled to be disclosed. 
3. Reconceptualizing Decryption 
As noted above, if a document is originally written in cipher, an 
individual cannot be compelled to render it readable even if the 
Government is in possession of the document so created, since such a 
request would both require the creation of new documents as well as 
call for the use of the individual’s contents of the mind.  To take it 
one step further, if the original document was handwritten in cipher 
by means of a simple mathematical function for which simple 
calculations were done on a computing device (e.g. calculator) the use 
of a mechanical device should not in theory defeat the above analysis 
either.
140
 
It may be logical to extend this hypothetical to the situation 
(common today) where the ciphertext documents are created wholly 
by means of mechanical computing without an individual’s 
involvement in higher level calculations beyond the creation of a 
passphrase for the software that performs the encryption process.  
Thus under this rubric, “the decryption and production of the contents 
of the hard drives” may be equal to creation of a new document rather 
 
 139. See, e.g., John E. D. Larkin, Compelled Production of Encrypted Data, 14 VAND. J. 
ENT. & TECH L. 253, 272 (2012). 
 140. For purposes of this hypothetical, I obviously overlook the lack of complexity of such 
a cipher and the ease with which the Government can break it, thus rendering any subpoena 
unnecessary.  At the same time, generally speaking, book ciphers (technically defined as codes) 
may be incapable of being decrypted by an unauthorized third party within a reasonable period 
of time.  SINGH, supra note 2, at 31.  An early example of a book code in American history dates 
back to the American Revolution when Benedict Arnold employed the first volume of the Fifth 
Oxford Edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England to pass coded 
communications to the British.  See J. Terrence Stender, Too Many Secrets: Challenges to the 
Control of Strong Crypto and the National Security Perspective, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 
287, 300 (1998). 
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than production of an existing decrypted one.
141
  The courts today, 
however, do not view encryption in such a fashion.  Instead the 
mental process of decryption has no significance beyond that of a 
non-testimonial physical act with possible testimonial implications. 
It may be that reconceptualizing decryption is unnecessary in 
light of the Eleventh Circuit’s careful application of the foregone 
conclusion doctrine.  Further, to date, in every precedent referenced 
herein, when the Government sought grand jury subpoenas or writs 
for production of the contents of encrypted drives, the courts always 
acknowledged in their findings that the Government’s attempts to 
decrypt the contents had been unsuccessful.
142
  Such observations 
may serve as a tacit understanding that the testimonial aspects of acts 
of production are greater than they seem.  On the other hand, such 
grants of immunity may be simply a rote application of precedent 
without any deeper meaning and thus open to further re-evaluation, 
particularly when law enforcement need so indicates.  Regardless, a 
more protective stance on compelled decryption does not leave the 
Government without any tools to proceed.  A grant of immunity 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 6002 would invalidate any 
constitutional objections to an order to decrypt.  Failure to disclose 
after a grant of immunity can lead to an imposition of civil and 
criminal sanctions. 
VI. COMPELLED PRODUCTION OF ILLEGAL CONTENTS 
In both Hubbell and Fisher, the Supreme Court dealt with the 
issue of compulsion in connection with documents that, in and of 
themselves, were not unlawful to possess.  For example, in Fisher, the 
documents in question were retained copies of individual tax returns 
as well as accountants’ work papers pertaining to the returns;143 in 
Hubbell, the produced documents were various financial documents 
from which the charging prosecutor later gleaned various tax 
 
 141. Should the ability to compel depend on the form of the original document ab initio?  
If a document is created by being typed on a computer, but it is not saved as plaintext and 
instead saved automatically in encrypted form, is there a plaintext document at all? 
 142. See, e.g., United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1234 (D. Colo. 2012) 
(“[A]gents have been unable to decrypt it.”); In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 13006, at *5-6 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009) (“The government is not able to open the 
encrypted files without knowing the password.  In order to gain access to the Z drive, the 
government is using an automated system which attempts to guess the password, a process that 
could take years.”); Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1339 (“The grand jury subpoena issued because the 
forensic examiners were unable to view the encrypted portions of the drives.”). 
 143. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 394 (1976). 
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crimes.
144
  Neither case dealt specifically with documents the 
possession of which alone constitutes a crime.  Nor have any cases 
tackled directly a situation where a defendant’s compelled decryption 
lead to the discovery of evidence relating to unrelated criminal acts.
145
 
Courts are likely to be faced with situations where they are 
required to compel putative defendants to decrypt contents when the 
individual stands accused of crimes of possession, for example, child 
pornography, pirated media content, and the like.  Under current 
precedent, such evidence (whether encrypted or not) is likely 
voluntarily created and thus is not entitled to self-incrimination 
protections absent testimonial act of production characteristics.
146
  
Similarly, as per Scenario IV above, use of evidence which was 
gleaned from compelled decryption of data, portions of which turn 
out to be relevant for prosecution of unrelated criminal acts (i.e., the 
existence of which was not a foregone conclusion), would not be 
foreclosed by the application of the Fifth Amendment privilege.  They 
are likely to be deemed discovered in “plain view”.  Whether recent 
developments in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence will or should 
preclude such evidence being used in the prosecution of unrelated 
offenses is discussed below in Part VIII. 
But, in such a case, the compelled production of unencrypted 
contents may be reasonably likened to Hubbell’s assembly and 
production of specifically designated categories of documents “where 
the prosecutor needed respondent’s assistance both to identify 
potential sources of information and to produce those sources” rather 
than a mere act of non-testimonial act of production.
147
  And, as seen 
above in Parts II and III, none of the cases dealing with compelled 
decryption have involved the Government seeking the issuance of a 
subpoena duces tecum or a writ as a primary investigative tool 
without first attempting to decrypt the data on its own.  Such an act of 
production would have greater testimonial significance than in cases 
involving business records or tax records which are in and of 
 
 144. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 32 (2000). 
 145. The extent to which the Boucher decision contemplated the plain view exception is a 
debatable issue.  See In re Boucher, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006, at *8 (“Second Circuit 
precedent, however, does not require that the government be aware of the incriminatory contents 
of the files; it requires the government to demonstrate with reasonable particularity that it knows 
of the existence and location of subpoenaed documents.” (emphasis in original)). 
 146. See McGregor, supra note 124, at 605-08, for discussion as well as logical difficulties 
in giving greater protection to encrypted contraband as opposed to encrypted documentary 
evidence such as dairies. 
 147. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 41. 
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themselves not criminal to possess and whose creation may be 
required by the relevant law.
148
 
In fact, some precedent is available to support this stricter 
proposition.  Ordinarily, production of physical evidence is not 
testimonial in nature—a defendant may be compelled to produce a 
blood sample or a handwriting sample, to put on a shirt, or to 
participate in a line up.
149
  But, under certain circumstances, such 
compelled production may carry significant testimonial aspects and 
greater Fifth Amendment concerns. 
In People v. Havrish, the Court of Appeals of the State of New 
York held that a defendant’s production of an unlicensed handgun 
which led to his prosecution for possession of same was privileged 
under the Fifth Amendment.
150
  The defendant was originally charged 
with unrelated crimes of assault and kidnapping among others.
151
  As 
a condition of the bail, the defendant was required to “[s]urrender any 
and all firearms owned or possessed.”152  He complied with the order, 
surrendering a number of long guns as well as a pistol which was later 
confirmed to be unlicensed.
153
  As a result, the defendant was 
subsequently charged with a criminal possession misdemeanor.
154
 
In holding that the defendant’s act of production was testimonial 
and incriminating in nature, and thus was subject to the application of 
the privilege against self-incrimination, the court ruled out the 
application of the foregone conclusion doctrine.
155
  The defendant’s 
act of production was the sole confirmation of the handgun’s 
existence and possession of same by the defendant.
156
  The court 
observed that “[b]efore defendant revealed that he had possessed a 
revolver [pursuant to court order] neither the court nor the police were 
aware that defendant owned a handgun.”157  Furthermore, the 
production was in itself incriminating inasmuch as “by the time 
defendant produced the weapon, he had provided the police with 
 
 148. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948), for a discussion of the required 
records exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege. 
 149. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 408 (collecting cases). 
 150. People v. Havrish, 8 N.Y.3d 389, 397 (2007).  Of note here, however, is the 
automatic application of the privilege under New York state law. 
 151. Id. at 391. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 395. 
 156. Havrish, 8 N.Y.3d at 395. 
 157. Id. 
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proof of virtually every element of the offense of criminal possession 
of a weapon.”158  As a result, the handgun’s suppression “was 
warranted in the weapon possession prosecution” and “the 
suppression of this evidence necessitated the dismissal of the 
accusatory instrument.”159 
VII.THE DANGERS OF REACTIONARY OVERREACTION 
The difficulties in separating the testimonial aspects of the act of 
production from the non-testimonial aspects require courts to 
approach such situations without a predisposition against a defendant 
who chooses to engage in lawful conduct of encrypting his or her 
data.
160
  As argued by Paul Ohm, such a person should not be viewed 
as a mythical “Superuser” who wanders the digital highways with 
anonymous destructive impunity; courts should be wary of accepting 
the Government’s insinuations in that regard as well.161  Although 
“the Fifth Amendment would not be violated by the fact alone that the 
papers on their face might incriminate the taxpayer, for the privilege 
protects a person only against being incriminated by his own 
compelled testimonial communications,”162 the testimonial character 
of acts of production lack clarity and requires fact-intensive 
examination on a case-by-case basis.  Of note here is the concurrence 
by Justice Thomas in Hubbell, which noted that Fisher has introduced 
“difficult parsing of the act of responding to a subpoena duces 
tecum.”163 
Lowering the hurdles to cover self-incrimination issues with 
respect to encryption would result in an imprudent disconnect 
between the treatment of physical and digital evidence.
164
  Law 
 
 158. Id. at 396. 
 159. Id. at 397. 
 160. The consequences of a refusal to comply with a subsequently determined incorrect 
order can be particularly dire.  For example, in Doe III, the witness spent about 8 months in jail 
for civil contempt before the 11th Circuit ordered his release after hearing Doe’s oral argument 
on appeal.  Doe III, 670 F.3d at 1340 n.12. 
 161. Paul Ohm, The Myth of the Superuser: Fear, Risk and Harm Online, 41 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1327, 1333-35 (2008).  The article also discusses the investigatory breadth already 
possessed by the state with respect to virtually warrantless Internet surveillance.  Id. at 1352. 
 162. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409 (questioning the expansive “private papers” doctrine 
established by Boyd). 
 163. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 56. 
 164. See, e.g., Ohm, supra note 161, at 1353-54.  Contra Andrew Ungberg, Note, 
Protecting Privacy through a Responsible Decryption Policy, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH 537 (2009) 
(calling for a separate approach to decryption which requires special particularized warrant 
requirements and a circumscribed use of the plain view exception). 
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enforcement personnel are constantly confronted with facts the 
discovery of which is impossible without self-incriminating 
compulsion, for example, the location of a murder weapon or other 
document or object necessary to prosecute a particular defendant.  
Yet, in such situations, an individual may not be compelled to 
disclose the location of such evidence despite law enforcement’s 
inability to locate or identify the same.  To force a suspect to decrypt 
data in the absence of strong indications of foregone conclusion 
places digital evidence on lesser footing than physical evidence at a 
time when evidence (in the form of information) is increasingly stored 
electronically and more crimes relate to use or misuse of 
electronically stored information.  To the extent that data is encrypted 
by means resulting in “plausible deniability,” compelled decryption 
without significant indicia of the foregone conclusion principle would 
be an obvious violation of the right against self-incrimination.
165
 
Similarly, to treat physically encrypted evidence memorialized in 
fixed form differently from evidence encrypted electronically, does 
not make much sense. 
Further, the effect encryption has on the investigative function 
should not be overestimated.  While encryption may make certain 
information inaccessible in a specific instance, it does not prevent law 
enforcement personnel from engaging in the multitude of other 
investigative techniques available to them.  For example, law 
enforcement has a relatively free hand in conducting Internet 
surveillance without notice to the investigative target.
166
  Similarly, 
cell tracking, which includes both caller location and text message 
content, is conducted without the involvement of the target through 
subpoena and non-subpoena requests to cellphone carriers.
167
  In 2011 
alone, the number of such requests totaled over 1.3 million.
168
  As 
information is increasingly communicated wirelessly, this relationship 
is bound to get more intrusive.
169
  Further, since a grant of use and 
derivative use immunity legally overcomes any self-incrimination 
concerns, it still remains one of the most powerful tools available to 
 
 165. Such a method of encryption was involved in Doe III.  See discussion supra Part III. 
 166. Ohm, supra note 161, at 1353-54. 
 167. Eric Lichtblau, Wireless Firms are Flooded with Requests to Aid Surveillance, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 9, 2012, at A1. 
 168. Id. 
 169. The recent disclosures of surveillance capabilities of the U.S. intelligence community, 
although thankfully beyond the scope of this paper, further illustrate the vulnerability of 
electronic data of all kind. 
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overcome constitutional objections to decryption.
170
  The perceived 
threat posed by encryption to the investigative function should not be 
used as a pretext to criminalize previously innocent behavior or to 
limit constitutional protections. 
In light of the novelty of encryption issues and the lack of 
precise mapping to existing precedent and physical world parallels, 
courts should tread very carefully in this arena and find an appropriate 
non-reactionary balance between protecting individual rights and 
privileges on the one hand, and law enforcement needs on the other.  
It remains to be seen whether the foregone conclusion principles as 
clarified in Doe are sufficient in this regard, particularly because of 
the relative simplicity of the facts therein as well as the arguably 
broader testimonial characteristics implicit in relevant acts of 
production relating to encrypted documents as discussed above. 
VIII. FOURTH AMENDMENT RAMIFICATIONS 
A similar conflict is currently developing under the rubric of the 
Fourth Amendment with respect to the plain view exception and 
search and seizure of electronically stored information (ESI).  The 
resemblance between the challenges of compelled decryption and 
discovery of unrelated incriminating evidence and seizure of 
electronically stored information and discovery of same requires a 
closer examination of the underlying principles behind the Fourth 
Amendment protections and the recent developments in the issuance 
of search warrants relating to ESI.  Ultimately, I propose that a 
stronger protective stance under the Fourth Amendment but not under 
the Fifth Amendment would be an untenable outcome leading to an 
inappropriate equilibrium between individual rights and state power. 
A. Overview of Relevant Jurisprudence 
The Fourth Amendment speaks to the prohibitions on searches 
and seizures and sets forth the basic requirements of probable cause 
and particularity in the issuance of warrants and the extent of searches 
and seizures conducted pursuant thereto.  It states that: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
 
 170. To the extent that a court order does not result in the target’s disclosure of the 
unencrypted contents, it will, of course, result in a criminal contempt order and, subsequently, a 
civil contempt order.  See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Witness Chanie Weiss, 703 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 
1983).  The situation is no different than any other court order requiring an individual to testify, 
who, subsequently, refuses to do so. 
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shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.
171
 
Although simple on its face, the Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence is not a model of judicial clarity.
172
  For example, the 
developed standard of “reasonable expectation of privacy” is 
employed to determine whether a particular state action constitutes a 
“search.”173  This doctrine’s application witnesses a spectrum of 
seemingly related exceptions and case-by-case rules.  One of the 
relevant exceptions to the warrant requirement relevant to the analysis 
here is the “plain view” exception.  As set forth in Horton v. 
California, the exception applies to situations where (1) law 
enforcement personnel is present lawfully at the place where evidence 
can be viewed (e.g., a valid search warrant), (2) law enforcement 
personnel must have “lawful right of access” to the object itself, and 
(3) the incriminating nature of the evidence must be “immediately 
apparent.”174  As a corollary, in the course of a lawful search, law 
enforcement personnel is not permitted to manipulate an object to 
bring it into plain view or to make the objects incriminating character 
apparent.
175
 
B. ESI Implications 
With the explosion of electronically stored information, the 
“plain view” exception now faces a wholly unprecedented doctrinal 
challenge of self-definition.  Unlike a search of physical objects and 
spaces, the enormous storage capacity of a computer makes such 
searches “extraordinarily invasive.”176  A lawful seizure and search of 
 
 171. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 172. Cf. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 476, 479 (2011) (collecting rules and proposing that the Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence is an on-going re-calibration of technological advances and law enforcement 
needs). 
 173. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 174. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 (1990).  The court logically observed that 
“[i]f an article is already in plain view, neither its observation nor its seizure would involve any 
invasion of privacy.”  Id. at 133.  Doctrinally, the plain view exception speaks more 
appropriately to seizures rather than searches.  Id. 
 175. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (reviewing an exigent circumstances search 
for weapons where a police officer turned over stereo equipment to check serial numbers).  See 
also Matthew Dodovich, Note, The Plain View Doctrine Strikes Out in Digital File Searches, 6 
I/S J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 659, 664 (2011). 
 176. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of Computer Search and Seizure, 96 VA. 
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storage media, for example, hard drives, back-up drives, and the like, 
puts into play any evidence thus discovered whether or not the 
evidence was specified in the search warrant or wholly unrelated to 
the crime investigated arguably through the operation of the plain 
view doctrine.
177
  In fact, judges usually issue extremely broad 
warrants relating to computer data, spurred on by tales of cyber-
criminals’ unparalleled abilities.178  Yet, at the same time, such a 
broad sweep of the plain view doctrine may cut against the 
particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment for warrants to 
specify “the place to be searched and the . . . things to be seized.”179  
Additionally, files stored on electronic media cannot be considered in 
“plain view” in the traditional sense of the term—they must be 
manipulated in order to reveal their nature.
180
 
To mitigate the severity of the outcome, a number of courts have 
imposed ex ante restrictions on computer searches conducted pursuant 
to a warrant, including conditions limiting the seizure of computer 
itself, conditions which impose time limits on the electronic search, 
conditions on how the electronic search must be conducted, including 
search terms and data segregation, and lastly, conditions on the return 
of seized hardware.
181
  For example, in United States v. 
Comprehensive Drug Testing,
182
 after a previous final and then 
withdrawn decision which made certain ex ante restrictions 
mandatory, the Ninth Circuit set forth a list of suggested guidelines to 
be used by magistrate judges in determining the reasonableness of a 
warrant for electronic data.  Among the guidelines were the need to 
insist on government’s waiver of reliance on the plain view doctrine 
with regard to digital evidence, the use of search protocols and the use 
of specialized non-investigative personnel to search the seized 
media.
183
  On the other hand, a few courts have approached the 
problem on an ex post basis, deciding the reasonableness of a 
 
L. REV. 1241, 1255 (2010). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Ohm, supra note 161, at 1354. 
 179. For discussion of issues in application of the plain view doctrine to electronic 
searches that do not exist with physical searches, see Andy Boulton, E-Discovery Rules and the 
Plain View Doctrine: The Scylla and Charybdis of Electronic Document Retention, 37 J. CORP. 
L. 435 (2012). 
 180. Id. at 444-45. 
 181. See generally Kerr, supra note 176. 
 182. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (en 
banc). 
 183. See Kerr, supra note 176, at 1257.  For an in-depth discussion of the case, see 
Dodovich, supra note 175, at 665-78. 
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conducted search on a case-by-case basis.
184
 
Orin S. Kerr has suggested that unrestrained ex ante regulation 
of search warrants is inadvisable and impedes development of proper 
constitutional outcomes.
185
  Others have proposed that searches and 
seizures of electronic media are conceptually no different than search 
and seizures of physical property and thus no special oversight is 
necessary in this realm.
186
  On the other side of the debate, proponents 
argue that such limitations provide a necessary backstop to 
government overreach and the devolution of narrow warrants into 
general ones.
187
 
What is relevant for the purposes of self-incriminating 
compulsion under the Fifth Amendment is the potential divergence in 
the protections provided by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 
resulting in an outcome where certain evidence, which would 
otherwise not be reachable by the operation of a warrant’s 
particularity and probable cause requirements, could still be obtained 
through self-incrimination by the operation of the foregone 
conclusion principles. 
First, on balance, the operation of the plain view doctrine in 
conjunction with the particularity and reasonableness requirements of 
the Fourth Amendment is much better in tempering the dangers of 
pretextual searches or fishing expeditions with respect to physical 
objects.
188
  Although the subjective intent of the search is generally 
not examined by the courts, the particularity requirements limit the 
type of evidence that may be discovered in “plain view” as the police 
can only look “in places and containers large enough to contain the 
specific physical evidence sought.”189  As a result, a search of 
physical evidence is considered unlikely to result in a general search 
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, even if the probable cause for a 
warrant issued was related to a criminal act that was ultimately not the 
object of the search.
190
 
Digital searches, on the other hand, are more susceptible to 
 
 184. See, e.g., United States v. Richards, 659 F.3d 527 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 185. Kerr, supra note 176, at 1277. 
 186. Josh Goldfoot, The Physical Computer and the Fourth Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. 
CRIM. L. 112 (2011). 
 187. Paul Ohm, Massive Hard Drives, General Warrants, and the Power of Magistrate 
Judges, 97 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 1 (2011). 
 188. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in the Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 
577 (2005) (discussing the need to re-evaluate the plain view doctrine in digital searches). 
 189. Id. at 568. 
 190. Id. 
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government abuses and involve an increasing generality of the search 
itself.  Today, computers store a wealth of information by and about 
the user with and without the user’s input or (sometimes) consent.191  
Absent an ex ante limitation on the mechanics of the search, a warrant 
for computer hardware necessarily subjects the whole universe on the 
storage media to the search.  A warrantless seizure, conducted without 
any judicial oversight whatsoever, is even more invasive.
192
  At the 
same time, given the virtually limitless capacity of storage media 
available to the average consumer, a pretextual search sufficiently 
grounded in probable cause relating to a minor offense (undoubtedly 
present on many a computer) is virtually guaranteed to bring to the 
surface not only evidence of criminal wrongdoing but other 
potentially incriminating or impeaching material that in itself does not 
constitute a criminal act.
193
 
The foregone conclusion jurisprudence under the Fifth 
Amendment should be mindful of the developments with respect to 
the plain view doctrine and ex ante restrictions relating to digital 
searches.  Lesser protections can not only create new avenues for law 
enforcement overreach, but are also likely to turn every defendant 
into a compelled self-informant as use of encryption becomes more 
widespread to secure increasing volumes of digitally stored personal 
information. 
CONCLUSION 
In today’s digital world, more and more criminal prosecutions 
involve dealing with electronic data.  The occurrence of electronic 
data as evidence is not limited to the white collar crime sphere and 
can be found in the prosecution of traditional street crime as well.  
Encryption poses a great challenge to the law enforcement function 
because it makes electronic evidence qualitatively different from 
physical tangible evidence, and at times, essentially impossible to 
analyze.  At the same time, physical tangible evidence may be 
actually replaced solely by electronic evidence—so that assigning 
fewer constitutional protections to the latter could greatly affect the 
balance of individual rights in criminal prosecutions. 
On the other hand, encryption is becoming standard operating 
procedure by individuals, white collar professionals and corporations 
 
 191. Ohm, supra note 187, at 6-7 (discussing the proliferation of data stored not only on 
users’ personal computers but also with third parties). 
 192. See Kerr, supra note 188, at 569. 
 193. Id. at 582. 
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for legitimate personal and business reasons.  In considering 
encryption issues, the courts should be mindful not only of the 
challenges that encryption presents to law enforcement, but also of 
the unintended consequences of creating rules that can greatly affect 
individual constitutional rights and protections.  Simply demonizing 
those who choose to use encryption and creating rules to eliminate the 
effects of encryption on law investigative capabilities, overlooks the 
realities of today’s digital world. 
The precedent to date has not been particularly instructive as to 
how the principles of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination will apply to encryption in the gray area in the middle.  
As the case law reads today, I would argue that it should not matter 
what kind of encryption program is used and the exact algorithm it 
applies to, for example, file space versus blank space, or how it 
operates to hide or otherwise make apparent the use of encryption on 
a particular device.  Under Doe, the focus appears to be on the 
government’s independent minimum knowledge of the encrypted 
contents, which may be obtained not only through a putative 
defendant’s cooperation, but also through advanced wiretapping and 
eavesdropping as well as more traditional human asset techniques.  
Under that approach, current jurisprudence leaves a lot of discretion 
to the courts in determining when a particular act of production rises 
to the level of a constitutionally protected testimonial deed.  It is thus 
incumbent upon the courts to understand not only how encryption 
works but also how important and pervasive electronic data has 
become in today’s society.  The Supreme Court has already heard 
cases relating to technological possibilities of electronic tracking and 
how such technology affects the balance established by the Fourth 
Amendment.
194
  Perhaps, in this technological era, the next challenge 
in the Fifth Amendment arena will come from a petitioner in a case 
dealing with encryption issues who heeds the call of Justice Thomas 
in Hubbell, where he concluded his concurrence with the following 
observation: 
None of the parties in this case has asked us to depart from Fisher, but 
in light of the historical evidence that the Self-Incrimination Clause may 
have a broader reach than Fisher holds, I remain open to a 
reconsideration of that decision and its progeny in a proper case.
195
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